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Should Consumers Request Cost Transparency? 
Antonis C. Simintiras, Yogesh K. Dwivedi, Geetanjali Kaushik and Nripendra P. Rana 
School of Management, Swansea University Bay Campus, Swansea, UK 
 
Abstract 
Purpose - Consumers en masse lack the information to judge price fairness thereby causing 
their ability to influence the economy to be overlooked. In this article, we propose that 
consumer choice be guided by price fairness judgements to increase consumer satisfaction 
and subsequently enhance market efficiency. 
Design/methodology/approach - This is an argumentative and conceptual work that aims to 
initiate a debate on this important yet unexplored issue. The arguments presented in the paper 
are based on economic and technological considerations.      
Findings - The measure for enabling a consumer price fairness judgement is unit cost 
information – the cost incurred by a firm to produce a product and/or service. The benefits 
and challenges stemming from the availability of unit cost information (i.e. cost transparency) 
to consumers and companies are presented and the likely impact of cost transparency on 
addressing information asymmetries between buyers and sellers are discussed. 
Originality/value: Although a significant body of knowledge exists on issues such as price 
transparency and how it is driven and enabled by the growth of the Internet, there is little or 
no evidence of research yet on issues related to cost transparency. We believe this work 
would create a new line of research for scholarly community leading to an impact on practice.           
 
Keywords: Consumer, Cost Transparency, Information Asymmetries, Unit Cost Information, 
Consumer Empowerment 
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1. Introduction 
In 2012/13, according to World Bank Group (2004), household consumption expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP varied from 34% in China, 55% in Australia, 56% in Canada, 57% in 
both France and Germany, 62% in India, 66% in the UK and 69% in the USA.
1
 Consumption 
expenditures are typically made by considering products and services that are ‘best for 
consumers’ without deliberation for what might be ‘best for the overall market economy’. 
Personal gratification is the main and often the only driver of consumer choice. That is, as far 
as the chosen products and/or services meet consumers’ needs and provide an expected level 
of satisfaction, they are content and condition their future behaviour according to those 
reflections. What the impact of their choice behaviour on the overall market economy and 
their long term interests is not usually a concern.    
In a free market economy, manufacturers and providers of similar goods and services 
respectively that are in direct competition with each other often operate at different levels of 
efficiency. From an economic perspective, more efficient companies are to be preferred to 
less efficient companies in a market economy. Operational efficiency is the capability of a 
business to deliver products or services to its customers in the most cost-effective manner 
possible while still ensuring the high quality of its products, service and support. For 
instance, if two companies compete with similar products, with the efficiency level in one 
company being higher than the other, all else being equal, consumer choice of the product 
manufactured by the most efficient company is also to be preferred. Informed choices at this 
level presuppose that consumers have easily obtainable and relevant information required for 
assessing seemingly equally attractive alternatives; however, this is not the case. Consumers 
just see products and prices.  
Accountability of achieved efficiency levels rests solely with companies. Economic theory 
postulates that market forces (i.e. primarily competitors) apply pressure on inefficient 
companies to improve or go out of business. For consumer spending (what the very existence 
of firms depends on) efficiency is a factor to which consumers have no input. The magnitude 
of household expenditures and the importance of how disposable incomes are used would 
logically imply that consumers ought to have information on the efficiency levels of 
companies. This would allow them to decide whether or not to support, through their choices, 
efficiently-run firms. As this information is not readily available to the consumer, companies 
– regardless of their efficiency – achieve market success through product/service 
differentiation and communications (Redmond, 2000; Rezabakhsh et al., 2006).  
Product and service-related information is widely available and, although it is crucially 
important for buying decision-making, it is not sufficient as it does not permit judgements 
pertaining to the price fairness of products and services. To determine price fairness of any 
offering necessitates information of unit cost information. Availability of unit cost 
information allows the comparison of unit cost and price on any offering in addition to 
comparisons between alternatives; the latter would help consumers identify the best 
alternative in the market within the context of price ‘fairness’. Making unit cost information 
readily available would (a) enable consumers to judge the price fairness of each offering and 
identify the best (monetary) deal, and (b) make companies more sensitive to both cost and 
pricing. For example, a company charging a higher price for a comparable product with a 
similar unit cost will either have higher profit margins or compensate for lower levels of 
efficiency (i.e. the higher price tag may result from higher non-manufacturing costs).  
Choice behaviour is dependent on product/service information. To make a choice, 
consumers’ need, at least, information about the price and quality of various alternatives they 
                                                          
1 http//:data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NE.CON.PETC.ZS 
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consider buying. When consumers are unable to accurately ascertain the quality and value of 
offerings (i.e. not able to decide price fairness) malpractices/misconduct of companies cannot 
be foretold or predicted (i.e. companies charging high prices for low quality products). Cost 
transparency is therefore necessary to eradicate such problems and help consumers optimise 
their choice behaviour in market exchanges. Specifically, cost transparency would (a) 
increase consumer satisfaction with their choices (i.e. allow a-priori judgements on price 
fairness) and (b) provide them with the opportunity to buy from efficiently-run companies 
propelling, in that way, competition between companies at the level of efficiency of 
operations; these are necessary conditions for a more streamlined market economy.    
In this article, by utilising an argumentative and conceptual approach, we postulate that cost 
transparency would (a) wipe out information asymmetries in the market-place, (b) empower 
consumers, (c) lead to better utilisation of company resources and (d) improve market 
efficiency. This article revolves around an assumption that price fairness judgements, 
facilitated by cost transparency, will benefit consumers, companies and the economy by 
enabling utility and efficiency maximisation of the resources available.  
 The remaining sections of this article are structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
relationship between availability of market information and market, price, and cost 
transparency through the escalation of widespread Internet for both producers and consumers. 
Subsequently, Section 3 discusses the concept of market transparency and its different types. 
The next section (i.e. Section 4) then converses about the price transparency and consumers’ 
judgement about the offerings of products and services made available by producers. Section 
5 discusses the various types of costs, one that could be most useful for the consumers, and 
cost transparency of products for consumers. The next section (i.e. Section 6) then discusses 
the benefits accruing from the availability of cost transparency for both consumers and 
companies. Section 7 presents the consumer empowerment and market efficiency in the 
context of cost transparency. The following section (i.e. Section 8) discusses how economic 
systems might best be served by consumers provided with the opportunity to support 
efficiently-run companies while pursuing their own self-interests. Finally, the paper 
concludes by outlining core arguments on cost transparency presented in this work.       
 
2. Availability of market information 
The recent escalation of widespread Internet availability has enabled an unprecedented 
upsurge in market information access. For example, the Internet provides consumers with 
information concerning available products/services, their prices and other important 
attributes. Moreover, the Internet allows consumers to compare prices of a single 
product/service offered at different retailers (e.g. mysupermarket.co.uk). Besides product 
attributes and price comparisons, consumers can access reviews pertaining to post-purchase 
evaluations and experiences of other customers (e.g. epinions.com). Even proprietary 
information can be obtained at some sites (e.g. travelocity.com) as consumers are granted 
access to the same reservation databases for flights to those used by travel agents.  
The Internet dissolves the traditional distinction of information sender and information 
receiver as each party acts both as sender and receiver of information (Hoffman and Novak, 
1997). Any Internet user can become a ‘communication partner’. The removal of 
geographical barriers further enables the formation of online communities or networks based 
around common interests instead of physical proximity. Such online networks allow 
customers to exercise their countervailing power (Rha and Widdows, 2002). Moreover, the 
interactivity afforded by the Internet allows consumers to be more active within the value 
chain. This implies that consumer scope of activity is not bound to options of either accept or 
decline an offer; instead, the user can independently influence the information flow (Rha et 
al., 2002).  
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Information on the Internet, however, is not always immune from abuse. Companies often 
resort to self-promoter’s strategy whilst maligning the products of their competitors. In 
addition, firms frequently resort to counter strategies for undermining the potential 
empowerment of consumers by means of the Internet. Such strategies comprise of price 
discrimination (Ancarani, 2002; Baye and Morgan, 2002), and product differentiation and 
bundling (Ancarani, 2002; Ellison and Ellison, 2009). Furthermore, the anonymous nature of 
the web poses a threat concerning the authenticity of information – something quite difficult 
to validate (Hansen et al., 2006; Rezabakhsh et al., 2006). In general, and regardless of 
potential abuses, the Internet has increased both the quantity and quality of available 
information that is needed for decision-making in purchasing situations (Hansen et al., 2006; 
Sinha, 2000). 
The marketing discourse clearly indicates a shift in power between consumers and producers. 
It has been concluded that over the last decade the Internet has caused a significant shift in 
power equations in favour of the consumer. This phenomenon is known as ‘new consumer 
sovereignty’ (Shipman, 2001) and has been recognised by various other authors (such as 
Carton, 2000; Rezabakhsh et al., 2006; Urban, 2002; Van Raaij, 1998). Therefore, from the 
signs emerging from published literature, it is evident that the role of consumers is changing. 
Various terms such as prosumer, consum-actor, protagonist and post-consumer have been 
coined to highlight the new ‘roles’ of the consumer. These terms are used to describe active 
and participative consumers along with their market experiences and relationships with firms 
(Cova and Dalli, 2009).    
Increased levels of available information reduce information asymmetries by the elimination 
of the relationship between richness and reach of information (Evans and Wurster, 2000). 
However, as far as information richness is concerned, there exists a fundamental divide 
between what information is available (i.e. information offered by businesses) and what 
information should be available (i.e. information needed by consumers). On the one hand, 
firms provide information about their products/services to help consumers decide their best 
alternative. Consumers, on the other hand, require additional information for deciding what a 
fair deal is. Unless a judgement (i.e. a comparison of a price with a pertinent standard, 
reference, or norm) pertaining to whether or not a price of an offering is fair (i.e. price that is 
reasonable, acceptable, or just) (e.g. Bolton et al., 2003; Kung et al., 2002; Xia et al., 2004), 
judgements on what is the best deal are not possible.  
Theoretically, consumers search for the best offerings from a pool of reasonable and fair 
alternatives. Unless all alternatives are fair and reasonable, there is a risk of sub-optimal 
choice behaviour. When information that is required for consumer decision-making (Murphy, 
2000) is inadequate, choice behaviour is impaired (Redmond, 2000). In addition, when 
consumers are inadequately informed, firms can benefit by imposing their own economic 
interests (e.g. higher prices, reduced quality) at the cost of the consumers’ interests (e.g. low 
prices, higher quality). This raises the question of how much consumers benefit from 
increased product information that does not allow them to decide what are the fair deals in the 
market? Alternatively, is transparency only an issue of how much information is available or 
what kind of information should be available as well? We return to this issue after a brief 
discussion of the concept of transparency and its different types.  
 
3. Market transparency  
In general, market transparency is regarded as playing a central role in promoting the fairness 
and the efficiency of markets (Report, 2001). Market transparency can be defined as the 
ability of market participants to obtain information about the trading process, (e.g. price, 
order size, trading volume, risk, and trader identity) (Madhavan, 2000). There are several 
types of transparency, although most research on e-marketing focuses on transaction cost 
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when explaining the underlying driving forces and the advantages of exploiting information 
technology (IT) (Hultman and Axelsson, 2007). Transparency is seen as a means of 
facilitating decreased transaction costs. For instance, the costs involved in identifying suitable 
products and/or suppliers and of undertaking comparisons between alternative propositions 
are reduced with greater transparency. The utilisation of IT has rejuvenated discussions on 
transparency as it offers consumers the ability to observe and share information which is 
generally not shared among partners in an exchange (Lamming et al., 2001).  
Cost transparency, in industrial purchasing, is the sharing of information related to cost 
between suppliers and buyers. It often includes data that would otherwise be maintained 
secretly by both parties during negotiations (Lamming et al., 2001). Transparency has also 
been examined in other areas of businesses such as corporate communication (Christensen, 
2002) and consumer marketing (Sinha, 2000). Furthermore, the concept of ‘line of visibility’ 
in services marketing – although not specifically addressing transparency – actually concerns 
transparency (Lovelock et al., 1999). However, in all cases, the key feature seems to be the 
capability to mutually share information that is not usually shared. Furthermore, relationship 
transparency, according to Eggert and Helm (2003), has been defined as any individual's 
perception of being notified about the suitable activities and characteristics of the other party 
involved in the interaction.  
Hultman and Axelsson (2007) offered a classification of four types of transparency and three 
facets that are relevant to all types. The four types are: cost/price, technology, organisation, 
and supply. The three facets are: degree, direction and distribution of transparency. The 
degree of transparency refers to the extent to which information is shared between suppliers 
and buyers. Information may be fully, partially or even not shared at all (Lamming et al., 
2001). Direction of transparency is concerned with the flow of information. Information flow 
in a buyer-seller relationship is typically bi-directional, but there are instances where the 
sharing of information is not reciprocal. This facet captures the non-reciprocal sharing of 
information between buyers and sellers. The third facet is concerned with the distribution of 
transparency. The unit of analysis for this facet changes from a dyad to that of a supply chain 
(Eggert and Helm, 2003). The distribution of transparency could either be direct or indirect. 
Specifically, direct transparency refers to transparency present in a specific relationship and 
indirect to transparency existing in a relationship that it is connected to a focal relationship. 
Market transparency is a necessary condition for effective market functioning. From a 
consumer perspective, it strengthens their confidence as they can identify and choose 
products and services that offer the maximum value. This confidence, in turn, acts as an 
incentive to search for such offerings and stimulates competition. The greater the market 
transparency is (i.e. availability and relevance of information), the higher will be the 
consumers’ confidence in the market. While transparency is a prerequisite for any free 
market, significantly different levels of transparency levels (i.e. information asymmetries) 
between buyers and sellers have harmful effects to its actors and the market economy.  
 
4. Price transparency 
The type of transparency this study focuses its attention on is cost/price transparency. Price 
transparency allows for comparisons of products and services available in the market, helps 
consumers determine the value of offerings and guides their choice of behaviour. Suppliers 
are often motivated to make comparisons tougher by masking price information in an attempt 
to manipulate consumer preferences (Carlin, 2009). Practices that obfuscate pricing involve 
the obvious concealment of prices in small print to inconspicuous ways of tossing in gifts or 
adding extra charges during the process of vending. The issue of price concealment is 
particularly acute for young and inexperienced consumers and products that are new and 
innovative. Such practices confound consumers and increase search costs required for 
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decision-making (Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Ramsay, 2007). Commercial tactics involving 
less-transparent pricing information could consequently have a negative impact on both 
decision-making and on the purchase behaviour of consumers.  
In addition to price obfuscation, limitations in consumers’ cognitive abilities influence their 
buying decision-making. The capability of shaping preferences is limited and adversely 
affected when choices available increase and reach saturation (Bettman et al.,1998; Markman 
and Loewenstein, 2010; Schwartz, 2004). The use of mental short cuts (e.g. preferring 
reputed brands over cheaper alternatives, equating price with quality, following expert advice 
provided by the supplier) and contextual cues (e.g. availability of products) and influentials 
(e.g. attitudes and opinions of family and peers) are known coping strategies (Henry, 2005). 
However, with the increase in cognitive burden, consumers tend to neglect a lot of the 
information available to them (Bettman et al., 1998; Henry, 2005); instead undertaking 
strategies aimed at ‘satisficing’. Satisficing is a blended word derived from 
‘satisfy’ and ‘suffice’ referring to a strategy for decision-making that meets the criteria for 
adequacy rather than optimality in purchase behaviour (Prabha et al., 2007). 
On account of the inherent complexities in psychological processes, as well as limits in 
cognitive abilities, conventional economic theory and choice models, according to van Boom 
(2011), often fail in the elucidation of consumer choice behaviour. Specifically, it has been 
argued that consumers do not always consider prices at their face value but in a broader 
perspective and ascribe greater meaning to them much above their monetary value (Liu and 
Soman, 2008). Specifically, they either underestimate or overestimate the significance of 
price in their decision-making processes. The undervaluing of price occurs when the context 
and personal attributes influence consumers to focus on features other than price. The 
overvaluing of price occurs when consumers consider price to signify quality even when 
price and quality of a product are completely uncorrelated (Chen et al., 2009; Hanf and von 
Wersebe, 1994; Kirchler et al., 2010). Regardless of how price information is used by 
consumers, availability of price information contributes to market transparency.  
Although it is important to understand the coping strategies and price value adjustments in 
consumer choice behaviour, it is equally, if not more, important to understand why these 
phenomena occur. Logic dictates that if a decision has to be made in the absence of adequate 
and/or relevant information, alternative cues, short cuts and coping strategies are necessary. 
For instance, how could a consumer choose between two alternatives with no information on 
whether or not the prices are fair so that these two options represent fair deals? Given the 
knowledge that one is a fair deal and the other is not, the choice is straightforward. If both 
represent fair deals then the choice will be a matter of preference. When information for 
judging price fairness is missing, consumers will inevitably seek alternative cues for 
decision-making with the aim of minimising the risk of making a sub-optimal choice. Price 
information, though necessary, does not allow for judgements on price fairness; it only 
permits comparisons between competing alternatives without a reference standard.  
From a consumer’s perspective, judging whether the price of a product is fair could be 
possible by reference to its unit cost. That is, price fairness will reflect acceptable difference 
thresholds between the unit cost of a product/service and its selling price. Depending on the 
magnitude of that difference, consumers could decide if a product was offered at a fair price 
or not. Similar evaluations can be made for each alternative, prior to deciding what the best 
deal is. Although price fairness and best deal are not synonymous, the former is an important 
prerequisite of the latter in comparisons of alternative offerings that are priced differently. As 
early as 1776, Adam Smith made a distinction between natural price (i.e. the amount which 
is ‘neither more nor less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of 
labour, and the profits of the stock ... according to their natural rates) and market price (i.e. 
the price which may prevail at any given point in time, being regulated by the proportion 
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between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and the demand of those who are 
willing to pay the natural price of the commodity).  
In Adam Smith’s years, it might have been easy to guess or estimate the natural price, but in 
our times, advancements in production technology and sophistication of management and 
marketing practices prevent the accuracy of such estimations. For instance, it is impossible 
for consumers to know the actual cost of a flat TFT 50”screen TV set, or the actual cost of an 
additional voice control added on a TV that usually causes a significant price increase in 
comparison to an identical set without this feature. The same applies to services. For 
example, what is the true cost of brain surgery, a flight, or a one-day training seminar? The 
same difficulty is likely to be encountered if a consumer wants to know the cost of each of 
the above in order to determine whether the price of a product or service is fair or not. To 
reiterate, price transparency allows for product/service comparisons but not for judgements 
pertaining to price fairness. Although a lack of cost transparency renders identification of best 
deals in the market impossible. We propose that its availability will largely eliminate this 
problem – an issue the discussion turns to next. 
 
5. Cost transparency 
Unit or product cost is 'the cost incurred by a company to produce, store and sell a unit of a 
particular product. Unit cost includes all fixed costs (i.e. plant and equipment) and all 
variable costs (labour, materials, etc.) involved in production’ (Aspromourgos, 2007). Unit 
cost comprises all functions involved in the process of making and bringing a product to 
market and its estimation, according to Sharman and Vikas (2004), is a complex task. 
Another type of cost that can be accurately traced to a product or service with little effort is 
the direct cost. Direct cost is the cost of materials, labour and expenses related to the 
production of a product or the provision of a service. For instance, if a company makes 
jewellery, the direct cost of a ring will be made up of the cost of materials used in producing 
it and the labour cost involved. Similarly, the direct cost of a carpet cleaning service will be 
the workers’ time (wages) to clean the carpet, and the cleaning materials used. Direct costs 
vary with the rate of output but are uniform for each unit of production. Direct costs are 
generally fixed in the short run and variable in the long run.  
In addition to direct costs, companies incur indirect costs. Indirect costs can be related to 
manufacturing of a product (i.e. manufacturing overheads) and other costs (i.e. non-
manufacturing overheads). Manufacturing overheads cannot be easily traced to products and 
include, amongst others, indirect materials, indirect labour and other costs that are required 
for the production operations such as insurance, depreciation of machinery, and electricity. 
Non-manufacturing overheads are also indirect costs associated with expenses related to, 
amongst others, selling, administration and interest expenses (i.e. cost of borrowed money). 
Although non-manufacturing costs are not assigned to products, they are always considered 
as part of the total cost of providing a specific product to a specific customer. In other words, 
the selling price of any product must be greater than the sum of the product cost (direct 
material, direct labour, and manufacturing overheads) and the non-manufacturing costs and 
expenses for a company to be profitable. 
Thus far, we have advocated that consumers do not have information to decide the price 
fairness of offerings. According to Xia et al. (2004), price fairness is a judgement of whether 
an outcome and/or the process to reach an outcome are reasonable, acceptable, or just and 
involves (from a cognitive point of view) a comparison of a price with a pertinent standard. 
At present, the pertinent reference standard is not available. The best consumers could do to 
arrive at some price fairness judgements is to attempt an educated guess of the direct unit cost 
of an offering, by looking at the prices of private labels. Usually, private labels offered at a 
lower price than branded products and a price comparison between private labels and national 
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brands provides them with some idea regarding unit cost (Sinha, 2000). When there is no 
marked difference in the attributes of two products, whilst there is a noticeable difference in 
price, a comparison provides some idea of the likely unit cost of products based on which 
price fairness judgements can be based.   
A lack of cost transparency means that consumers cannot accurately determine the direct unit 
cost of products (Bolton et al., 2003); consequently, they revert to other comparisons to 
determine price fairness (see Xia et al. (2004) for a review of price fairness perceptions). 
Comparing prices to references other than direct unit costs are likely to be biased, unjust and 
unwarranted. Such comparisons may lead to choosing offerings that are not fair deals while 
rejecting fairer options. Drawing from findings indicating that price transparency has led to a 
decrease in brand loyalty (Sinha, 2000), we argue that cost transparency and subsequent 
choice based on price fairness judgements will increase loyalty to products and services that 
offer high value. The fact that price comparisons erode brand loyalty is indicative of 
consumers’ need for more informed choices. Nonetheless, there are ways for selling 
organisations to combat the effect of cost and price transparency; for instance, there will 
always be a demand for innovative new products, products of high quality or products that 
improve consumers' lives (Sinha, 2000). For such products, consumers will be willing to pay 
higher prices despite higher unit cost - price differentials.  
The type of cost information that will be most useful to consumers for deciding price fairness 
is the direct unit cost or the direct unit cost including the manufacturing overheads. 
Availability of direct unit cost information will, undoubtedly, empower consumers. However, 
information on direct unit cost poses a problem especially for those consumers who do not 
actually know what direct unit cost is and what it includes. For example, if a consumer 
believes that an organisation incurs only manufacturing costs (excluding all indirect costs and 
expenses), they might become very critical of the gap between the direct unit cost and the 
price of a product, and judge the price of an offering as unfair. On the other hand, if a 
consumer knows that the direct unit cost excludes indirect costs (e.g. administration, storage 
and logistics, marketing), it is highly likely to accept a higher price as they will be aware of 
the additional costs involved in bringing a product to the market.  
Cost transparency will influence consumers’ tolerance to differences between direct unit cost 
and price of offerings. Larger differences between a product’s direct unit cost and its price 
(i.e. difference thresholds) may be seen with scepticism and turn consumers away from such 
products. On the contrary, products with smaller differences between direct unit cost and 
price may be seen more favourably and considered as fair and good deals. Furthermore, 
comparisons between alternatives at the level of their direct unit costs will be possible. For 
example, a comparison of direct unit costs between two very similar products will indicate 
the level of production efficiency of the respective companies. This is an important 
comparison as it could inform consumers’ choice behaviour beyond the level of personal 
gratification. That is, choosing products/services with the lower direct unit cost will be a vote 
of confidence for efficiently run companies.   
 
6. Benefits from the availability of cost transparency 
Increased market transparency facilitated by the Internet has helped in reducing information 
asymmetries between buyers and sellers (Grewal et al., 2003; Kung et al., 2002; Lindbeck 
and Wikstrom, 1999; Pitt et al., 2002; Reisch, 2003; Rha and Widdows, 2002). For example, 
facets of market functioning that have been positively impacted by greater transparency 
include information search behaviour by customers, corporate policy on information 
disclosure and third-party communication by consumer organisations. To reiterate, 
consumers can now retrieve, compare information and make effective decisions regarding 
products in a cost-effective and rapid manner. In addition, customers can share their personal 
9 
 
experiences regarding products and services with a vast number of individuals (Stauss, 2000). 
Furthermore, product experiences which were previously available only after purchase 
(Klein, 1998) are now shared in reviews posted online by other users providing information 
to prospective buyers.  
The proliferation of market information has increased consumers’ market power (Lindbeck 
and Wikstrom, 1999). For instance, the ease of access to available information allows 
consumers to compare and evaluate various alternatives, minimising in that way their 
information search costs. In addition, price transparency allows customers to compare various 
options and employ savings maximisation strategies without compromising their satisfaction 
with the chosen options. In addition, information availability propels competition between 
firms. For example, companies compete well beyond a price to the point that the chain for 
some companies now begins with the consumer who initiates the process with a need and 
makes a request for the product, following which production begins (Van Raaij, 1998). In this 
instance, the roles coalesce, leading to a consumer becoming a prosumer or a comarketer. 
The Internet facilitates the assimilation of consumers in the value chain thereby modifying 
the boundaries between consumers and firms (Lindbeck and Wikstrom, 2003).  
Availability of direct unit cost information will offer several advantages to consumers and 
companies. For consumers, the following two benefits are worth mentioning. First, it will 
allow consumers to make judgements on price fairness enhancing in that way their evaluation 
of alternatives. This will enhance consumers’ buying decision-making as they will be able to 
use price fairness as a means of identifying best deals in the market and increasing 
satisfaction with their final choices. Second, it will help consumers extrapolate information 
pertaining to the efficiency level of companies which, in turn, may influence their choice of 
company. Consumers’ decision to buy offerings from the most efficient companies will 
increase overall market efficiency. For companies, the provision of direct unit cost 
information will motivate them to use robust methods for estimating product/service costings 
(Kaplan, 1990) - a prerequisite for effective management and for building a sustainable 
competitive advantage - and prompt them to compete at the level that matters most; that is, 
efficient utilisation of resources in providing attractive offerings.  
Given that direct unit cost information reflects the cost of materials and/or labour involved in 
producing a product, this could be used as an indication of quality. Currently, judgements on 
the quality of most offerings are based on price comparisons. Often, high prices are 
associated with high quality and vice versa. As this association does not always hold true, 
quality judgements in environments (i.e. markets) characterised by asymmetric information, 
disadvantages consumers and offers profitable opportunities to firms selling low quality 
goods at high prices to uninformed buyers (Cooper and Ross, 1984). Inadequately informed 
consumers in need of making judgements on the quality of products/services are severely 
disadvantaged and often subject to being misguided by ‘dishonest’ firms. Even if conditions 
of information equilibrium prevailed, prices and product attributes rarely convey adequate 
information for judgements on the quality of offerings. Consequently, consumer judgements 
are compromised as an additional search for other proxy indicators of quality (i.e. firm’s 
reputation, warranties) and increased search costs (Cason and Friedman, 1999). 
Consumer choice behaviour based on inadequate information often comes at a cost to their 
pockets (Cohen and Winn, 2007) and at a cost to the free market economy as information 
disequilibrium diminishes market efficiency (Kuhn and Martinez, 1996), distorts competition, 
and erodes the competitiveness of companies in the long term. Undoubtedly, availability of 
unit cost information will be a controversial issue. On the one hand, consumers may claim 
that this is one of the most basic and important rights that have long been overdue. That is, to 
be able to assess the price fairness of products and services they consider buying. Knowing 
that a price paid is a fair price will increase their satisfaction and confidence in the free 
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market system. On the other hand, companies will most likely consider product costing to be 
an issue of ‘internal affairs’ and not a piece of information to become public knowledge. 
They could argue that price costings are reflected in prices and, as choices are vast in today’s 
markets, consumers are free to choose products that meet both their needs and price 
expectations.  
It has long been recognised that it is easy for companies to charge higher prices when 
information asymmetries exist in the market (Stiegler, 1966). The prevailing argument is that 
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers increases buyers’ search costs (Biswas, 
2004) and the lower the search costs for any actor in the market the lower will be the overall 
information asymmetry (Rothschild, 1974). For example, if all buyers were perfectly 
informed about the available price alternatives, ‘perfect market conditions’ would exist and 
any company, all else being equal, charging a higher price to its product than its competitors, 
will not be able to sell anything (Rothschild, 1974). Although, to a large extent, the 
relationship between search costs and information asymmetry holds true, we argue that price 
transparency even at ‘perfect competition conditions’ does not provide consumers 
information that is needed for price fairness judgements. In order to eradicate information 
asymmetries, consumers should know if an assigned price is a fair price – this can only be 
possible when information on direct unit cost of offerings, allowing for price-cost difference 
to be estimated, becomes available.  
 
7. Consumer empowerment and market efficiency 
Cost transparency will increase consumer empowerment. Consumer empowerment is defined 
as the subjective state that is evoked by perceptions of greater personal control (Skinner, 
1996; Wathieu et al. 2002) and it occurs through the provision of greater information or 
enhanced consumer understanding (Brennan and Ritters, 2004; Cutler and Nye, 2000; Rust 
and Oliver, 1994). Therefore, consumer empowerment results from a ‘gains’ comparison in 
terms of previously allowed control to that which exists at present. Use of power is capable of 
producing desirable outcomes and prevents undesirable outcomes from occurring. However, 
it is the increased perception of greater control that evokes empowerment; hence, it might be 
experienced whether there is an increase in actual control or not (Wathieu and Bertini, 2007). 
Empowered consumers exert control over the elements of the marketing mix, such as price 
(Wathieu et al., 2002) and certain characteristics of the communication process (Cova and 
Pace, 2006; Firat and Dholakia, 2006). 
The greater personal control exercised by empowered consumers (Denegri-Knott et al., 2006) 
can be exerted in three ways. First, consumers feel a sense of empowerment when they 
combine their skills and resources in order to force producers to undertake those actions, 
which they otherwise would not perform. Secondly, consumers obtain power when they are 
able to influence and even create special spaces in the market in which they build their own 
cultural identity. Thirdly, consumers are empowered when they are capable of counteracting 
the communication of firms and institutions thereby affecting their credibility (Hunter and 
Garnefeld, 2008). Therefore, the extent of consumer empowerment depends on the number 
and quality of value propositions, which exist in the market, market knowledge, and ability to 
gather new market information and take advantage of alternative value propositions. Cost 
transparency will enhance consumer empowerment through better evaluation of alternative 
value propositions and increased levels of market knowledge. 
Empowered consumers need not be essentially decisive. Consumers make every effort to 
derive the greatest satisfaction from the consumption process, and the better firms facilitate 
the process of consumer empowerment, the better their sense of contentment is (Wright et al., 
2006). In a stark contrast to the above view, consumer empowerment is considered as a 
process through which consumers gradually become more self-governing subjects (Shankar 
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et al., 2006) who are accountable for the alternatives that affect their purchase decisions and 
consumption activities. Cost transparency empowers consumers by providing information 
that allows them to estimate cost-price differences and determine price fairness. For example, 
a comparison between competing alternatives (other factors remaining the same) suggests 
that a firm with the lowest price and the lowest unit cost product offers the best deal and 
makes a better use of its resources, respectively. On account of judicious utilisation of 
resources, it is likely that such firms are also more socially responsible. The support of such 
efficient firms by consumers would imply putting pressure on the other firms to enhance their 
efficiency in terms of resource utilisation. Thus, consumer choice behaviour would promote 
operational efficiency of companies.  
Efficiency levels attained, through leveraging resources that contribute most to their success, 
differs amongst companies, yet regardless; all products/services produced or provided by 
companies reach the market and compete with other offerings. That means, less efficient 
companies have the opportunity to compensate for their inefficiencies through careful pricing 
and positioning of their offerings. By the same token, consumers do have the freedom to 
choose the alternative that offers the maximum value but without knowing (a) whether or not 
prices are fair and (b) how to safeguard their short and long term interests through an increase 
of the value of all offerings in the marketplace. Consequently, their buying decision-making 
is compromised as evaluations of alternative offerings lack an objective reference standard 
(i.e. direct unit cost) for comparison, and choice is not informed by the operational efficiency 
of providers. Thus, an inadequately informed choice could be, and often is, sub-optimal for 
consumers, most companies and the economic system. 
The notion that consumer empowerment contributes to market efficiency requires 
empowerment to shift its focus away from ‘more information’ to that of ‘pertinent 
information’. Pertinent information needed by consumers should not be seen as a gain that 
comes as someone else’s loss (i.e. supply side). More information about offerings to choose 
from does not help consumers or producers and certainly has a negative impact on market 
efficiency. For example, consider a range of almost identical competing products that are 
priced similarly, though the unit cost of each product varies considerably. If consumers were 
to choose the product with the lower unit cost, their money would have been directed to the 
most efficient company. The most efficient company will gain both from higher sales and 
perhaps higher profit margins. Unless other companies can innovate and differentiate their 
products/services, they will be at a competitive disadvantage. That is, highly priced products 
with higher unit costs may not fare well in the market unless the higher unit cost reflects a 
noticeable difference in the quality of those products.  
Competition driven by cost transparency will eventually leave in the market only the 
efficiently run companies – at which point price-based competitive advantages will be a 
sensible strategy for companies with lower non-manufacturing costs. For instance, if a 
company has significantly lower non-manufacturing costs than others, it will have the 
flexibility to lower the price of its products while maintaining reasonable profit margins. The 
low cost - low price strategy would be the main strategy for gaining a competitive advantage. 
Competitors with higher non-manufacturing costs will not have this advantage, and unless 
they improve (i.e. lower their non-manufacturing costs), they will need to squeeze their profit 
margins in order to remain competitive, or else go out of business. When the market reaches 
this point, consumers will be able to decide price fairness and reach informed decisions on 
best deals. By comparing costs and prices, consumers will know what competing options 
offer the best value for money. With the exception of ‘new to market’ innovative products 
and services, and until competitors move into the market with similar products, all other 
offerings will be open to such evaluations.   
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For businesses, the main objectives are to maximise its profits and to protect the conditions 
that supports their existence and growth. For consumers, the main objectives should be to 
maximise the value they get from market exchanges and safeguard the conditions for value 
maximisation. Companies are fully aware of what needs to be done in order to achieve their 
objectives. Consumers are not, and until they find ways of obtaining the maximum of value 
in market exchanges and support market efficiency with their choices, they will be at peril of 
having to choose the best alternative out of a pool of sub-optimal ones. 
 
8. Discussion  
The theme of this article has focused on the demand side of a free market economy and the 
critical question has been ‘do consumers in pursuit of self-interest fulfilment have adequate 
information to achieve utility maximisation?’ Largely owing to the Internet, prices have 
become more transparent and the availability of price information has contributed to better 
buying decision-making (Biswas, 2004). However, although price transparency helps identify 
the best deal amongst a set of considered alternatives, it does not provide information 
pertaining to whether or not alternatives are a fair deal. Hence, the question: Is the best deal 
necessarily a fair deal? A fair deal is difficult to define but consumers are increasingly 
seeking to know whether prices advertised reflect a fair transaction. 
To most consumers, fair means the seller's actual costs plus a reasonable premium. To the 
degree that buyers can determine what a fair price is, they can seek the best bargain available 
to avoid overpaying for brands whose prices are clearly out of line (Sinha, 2000). Cost 
transparency should therefore enable consumers to make price fairness judgements.  
We have argued that availability of unit cost information will be beneficial both to consumers 
and companies. However, would it be uniformly beneficial to all actors in the marketplace? 
Consumers on the one hand will certainly gain from cost transparency (i.e. better decision-
making), with the worst-case scenario being to misuse or ignore this information. Companies, 
on the other hand, could find that the provision of unit cost information impairs their ability 
to obtain higher profit margins, turn products and services into commodities, reduce customer 
loyalty to their brands and affect their reputation by targeting market perceptions of price 
unfairness (Sinha, 2000). Notwithstanding the benefits accruing from cost transparency for 
the supply side (i.e. prompt companies to make better and more efficient utilisation of 
resources), the drawbacks are disproportionate when compared to those for the demand side. 
Should companies, therefore, refuse to make unit cost information available if and when the 
demand side requests it? Or, and from a marketing point of view, should companies aim to 
satisfy customers’ needs even when it comes to cost transparency?  
Price fairness judgement involves a comparison of a price with an appropriate standard, 
reference, or ‘norm’ (in this case unit cost). Such comparisons are fairly straightforward to be 
made, although how price fairness and/or price unfairness judgements can be made and 
articulated is difficult to predict and is an area in need of further research. A price comparison 
leading consumers to judgements of equality, advantaged inequality, or disadvantaged 
inequality will be replaced with judgements pertaining to what alternative is fairest. With unit 
cost availability, comparisons will be made between the price of an offering and its unit cost 
rather than against the prices of other offerings. Nonetheless, price fairness perceptions differ 
for different customers, products and services, company types and cultures. Consequently, 
perceptions of price fairness are expected to vary widely and to be biased by the self-interests 
of the individual. Despite such differences, cost transparency will allow consumers to buy the 
fairest and best option leading to satisfaction maximisation and backing efficient companies. 
An important issue is who should initiate and regulate cost transparency? Should it be 
enforced by consumers, firms, and/or governments? It is reasonable to assume that consumers 
should exercise their rights and demand that companies provide unit cost information of their 
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products and services. It is moreover common knowledge that many consumers participate in 
online blogs and often voice their opinions in online forums. This could be taken one step 
further, with consumers sharing their views of the need for cost transparency, with other 
consumers. Social networking, with consumers having greater control over it, can easily 
facilitate the sharing of such views. Ultimately, the decision pertaining to the provision of 
unit cost information rests with organisations. Companies can make this information 
available only at their will and it is difficult to predict their responses. However, consumers 
have nothing to lose and much to gain from cost transparency. The role of government is not 
needed beyond the level of overseeing the adherence of companies to the laws and 
regulations or reporting accurate information. 
 
9. Conclusion  
Cost transparency is not a new idea, but considering it from a consumers’ perspective, it has 
the potential of turning into a massive scale initiative. However, regardless of the extent of its 
appeal, it should always be the responsibility of consumers to make it happen. The rationale 
is that optimal decision-making is based on available information. In addition to the amount 
of available information, we stress the need for ‘pertinent information’ as well. Cost 
transparency, on the one hand, will result in more effective decision-making and choice 
behaviour where the customers’ needs will be fully met and satisfaction will reach its maxim. 
On the other hand, companies will have to differentiate their offerings from those of 
competitors, by maximising efficiency levels while searching for profitable innovations. 
Although market economies are enormously complicated, there are disturbing power 
imbalances and information asymmetries in favour of the supply side. The demand side (i.e. 
consumers) has yet to play its role of safeguarding its interests and making a decisive 
contribution in a self-regulated market. This article paves the way in addressing this very 
issue by offering one possible way forward.  
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